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Anti-corruption Institutions and
Governmental Change in Pakistan
Zulfiqar Ali
The author dedicates this article to anonymous reviewer 1.
1 In much of the recent research in security studies, Pakistan has been viewed as a serious
threat  to  the  region  and  the  world  because  of  the  risk  posed  by  terrorist  groups
potentially gaining access to the country’s nuclear explosives (Blair 2011, Clarke 2013).
Comparative  political  studies  portray  full  democracy  as  a  cure  for  extremism
(Brooks 2009), bad governance (Stockemer 2009) and corruption (Rock 2009). Yet in the
case of Pakistan, many authors have considered the army an impediment to rather than a
facilitator  of  the  development  of  democracy  (Shah 2014)  and  a  supporter  of  Islamic
extremism (Nasr 2004). Critics of the armed forces of Pakistan usually cite the country’s
beleaguered  political  history  as  evidence.  Indeed,  since  independence  in  1947,  three
military  takeovers  (1958–1971,  1977–1988,  1999–2008)  have  disrupted  democratic
governments.  Since  2008,  although  the  military  has  retreated  to  the  barracks,
commentators have pointed out that it retains an influential role in the political sphere
(Shah and Asif 2015). Yet very few Pakistan scholars, including those having worked on
corruption,  such as  Faisal  Khan (2007)  or  Sumaira Samad (2008),  have examined the
association between the pursuit of accountability and the use of anti-corruption agencies
for political purposes.
2 The  relation  between  the  practice  of  democracy  and  the  activity  of  anti-corruption
institutions,  however,  deserves  attention.  Several  studies  on  democracy  and
democratization argue that  democracy cannot  impart  political  stability  and establish
civilian supremacy over the military unless it coincides with good governance and the
rule of law (Kohn 1997, Nicolescu-Waggonner 2016). Among Asian countries, only Hong
Kong and Singapore have been relatively successful in reducing corruption due to the
political  commitment  of  their  leaders  and  the  impartial  implementation  of  anti-
corruption measures (Quah 2011). This fact highlights the role of political will as a key
factor in the successful implementation of anti-corruption reforms.
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3 The paper focuses on some of Pakistan’s key institutions of governance—anti-corruption
agencies—in order to find out whether a change of  government brings about certain
policy changes within anti-corruption agencies in favor of governmental political parties.
Indeed, some authors have exposed the political use of anti-corruption agencies such as
the NAB (Chêne 2008, Khan, Kakakhel, and Dubnick 2004), but these studies only highlight
specific instances. As a result, we have no full view of the overall performance of anti-
corruption agencies in connection with parties in government. This paper is the first
focusing on performance data and trying to explain the overall performance from the
political perspective.
4 Pakistan’s first anti-corruption organization,1 the Ehtesab Cell (EC), was established by
the November  1996 Ehtesab Ordinance promulgated by  the  caretaker  government  of
Prime Minister Malik Meraj Khalid, and then operated under the elected government of
Nawaz Sharif, who passed the Ehtesab Act, 1997. In November 1999, it was transformed by
the National Accountability Ordinance into the National Accountability Bureau (NAB),
after  General  Pervez  Musharraf  staged  a  military  coup  and  proclaimed  that  his
government would subject  politicians and administrators  to  “ruthless”  accountability
(Musharraf 2006:150). After a decade during which elected governments were regularly
dismissed on grounds of corruption, Pakistan and its anti-corruption agencies have been
overseen by four distinct  governments since 1999.  First,  the state came under direct
military  rule  on  October  12,  1999  when  General  Musharraf  overthrew  the  elected
government of Nawaz Sharif, initiating a period of “military regime.” Second, a transition
from direct to indirect military rule took place in October 2002 when the Pakistan Muslim
League-Quaid-i-Azam (PML-Q), under the patronage of the army, emerged as the majority
party  in  the  general  elections  and ruled  the  country  for  the  next  five  years.  Third,
Musharraf’s loyalist party, the PML-Q, lost to its rival political parties in the February
2008  general  elections,  after  a  country-wide  protest  movement  that  contested
Musharraf’s rule in 2007. The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) managed to form a coalition
government and rule the country for the following five years (2008–2013). Fourth, the
PPP’s tenure, tainted by allegations of misuse of power and mismanagement, contributed
towards the overwhelming victory of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) in the
May 2013 general  elections.  As  a  result,  the PML-N came to power and brought  the
accountability institutions under its control.
5 Relying on the NAB data combined2 with an analysis of anti-corruption laws—the Ehtesab
Ordinance, 1996, the Ehtesab Act, 1997, and the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999
—, this article examines the entanglement of accountability procedures with the actual
struggle over power, an entanglement so deep that it shapes both the constitution and
the evolution of anti-corruption organizations. The first section of the article discusses
the political factors that have played a crucial role in the formation of Pakistan’s anti-
corruption organizations. The second section turns to the legal provisions underpinning
accountability institutions and argues that the anti-corruption legal system tends to favor
powerful  individuals  over  weaker  ones.  The  third  section  analyzes  the  actual
performance  of  anti-corruption  agencies  to  show  that  political  considerations  have
largely influenced their conduct. Indeed, the paper suggests that the same institutions
that have aggressively convicted corrupt officials under some governments have entered
into plea discussions under others, a fact which highlights that government transitions
have  serious  effects  on  the  conduct  of  supposedly  independent  anti-corruption
mechanisms. Indeed, Pakistan’s anti-corruption institutions have largely been used by
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those in power to maintain their grip on the state by weakening their opponents. The
army has used anti-corruption agencies to hold civilian politicians accountable, while the
sitting government has used them against political parties in the opposition. Finally, the
paper  concludes  that  a  high  level  of  political  animosity  results  in  a  high  level  of
performance for accountability institutions.
 
Undemocratic foundations
6 When supposedly independent state institutions are used to serve the interests of the
governing party, this process is called “politicization” of institutions (Pierre 2004:3). The
politicization  of  state  institutions  takes  place  not  only  in  recent  states  with  hybrid
regimes or defective democracies but also in old democracies with established rule-of-law
traditions (Peters, Falk, and Pierre 2004). No state has thus developed truly independent
institutions—institutions operating without any concern for the interests and concerns of
the key members of the government (Collins 2011). Yet, some political systems are quite
clearly  far  more  politicized  than  others.  In  the  case  of  Pakistan,  several  public
administration  scholars  have  accused  the  civil  services  of  favoring  those  in  power
(Chaudry 2011,  Khurshid 2011).  The  classical  perspective  on  bureaucracy—an efficient
machine marked by certain impersonal characteristics, one that is able, in Max Weber’s
words,  to  “treat  everybody without  regard to  the person” (Weber,  Roth and Wittich
1978:956)—has rarely been witnessed in operation in Pakistan (Wilder 2009)—or perhaps
anywhere at all (Collins 2011).
7 A few examples will illustrate the degree of politicization in Pakistan. The highest judicial
authority, the Supreme Court,  has repeatedly endorsed military takeovers,  in spite of
clear constitutional provisions on civilian control of the military (State v. Dosso and another
1958; Begum Nusrat Bhutto v. Chief of Army staff and Federation of Pakistan 1977; Syed Zafar Ali
Shah and others v. General Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistan and others 2000). This
intertwined conduct of the judiciary and politics in Pakistan has been described as the
“judicialization of politics” (Kausar 2013) or “politicization of judiciary” (Dawood 1994).
Judges are often accused of granting political favors even when they apparently remain
neutral  in  the  proceedings  (Newberg  2002:228).  The  bureaucracy,  often  slow  in
performing its duties, tends to become highly efficient when called on to provide services
to dominant groups (Zafarullah and Akhter 2001). For instance, the administrative elite
has  rigged  water  management  in  various  parts  of  the  country  in  favor  of  powerful
landlords, hence using water as a means to patronize political allies and harass opposition
members (Mustafa 2002, Wegerich and Hussain 2016). This reminds us in some ways of
Marx’s analysis that the bureaucracy uses the state apparatus as its private property
(Marx, O’Malley, and Davis 1994:14). The police administration is also subject to similar
biases: while it effectively manages protocol and guarantees the security of the political
elite, it has an inclination to become callous and disinterested when ordinary citizens are
concerned  (Petzschmann 2010).  Another  example  is  that  of  the  revenue  department,
which frequently comes up with new tax amnesty schemes as an incentive for powerful
people  to  voluntarily  bring  themselves  within  the  tax  net  (Cheema 2012,  Levi  and
Suddle 1989).
8 Such examples indicate that state institutions whose legitimacy depends in principle on
delivering public goods and services, enforcing law and order, establishing the rule of
law, and protecting the rights of individuals, have tended to serve those in power. Public
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administrators have usually been subservient to the political elite during civilian rule,
expanding the latter’s political base by intimidating political opponents and patronizing
allies. Yet most administrators change their loyalties and defy their old masters when the
military  takes  over  through  a  coup  (Mustafa 2002,  Shafqat 1999,  Tanwir  and
Fennell 2010). The flaws and shortcomings inherent in Pakistan’s administrative system
seem not  to be the result  of  arbitrary factors  but  may have certain structural  roots
(Islam 1989,  2004).  Anti-corruption institutions have been created within these fragile
and polarized political  and institutional  settings in hopes they would apprehend any
corrupt official without any bias. We may assume that democratic governments usually
have an incentive to pursue anti-corruption efforts in fear of losing voters’ support. But
the  association  between  democracy  and  corruption  has  demonstrated  a  somewhat
unusual  pattern  in  Pakistan,  which  comes  to  light  when  examining  the  particular
conditions in which the country’s anti-corruption institutions were established.
9 Indeed, neither the Ehtesab Cell nor the National Accountability Bureau was created by a
democratic  government.  The first  agency was  established by  an appointed caretaker
government after the dismissal of the second Benazir Bhutto government in November
1996, a time marked by bitter inter-party rivalry between two major political parties—the
PML-N  and  the  PPP  (Arif  2001,  Rizvi  2000b).  According  to  article  224  of  the  1973
Constitution,  the  sole  duty  of  the  caretaker  government  is  to  oversee  the  general
elections and the transfer of  power to the newly elected government (CIRP 2015).  Its
mission being limited and of  a strictly executive nature,  it  cannot in principle make
significant  policy  decisions.  However,  in  1996,  the  unelected  setup  went  beyond  its
mandate and established an accountability agency in spite of repeated criticisms coming
from political parties, to which the caretaker Prime Minister, Malik Meraj Khalid, replied
that  accountability  was  far  more  important  than  elections  (LaPorte  1997:122).  The
controversial  formation  of  the  EC  by  the  caretaker  administration  reveals  that  the
interest of unelected institutions played a key part in the creation of the EC.
10 When the PML-N won the 1997 general elections with an absolute majority and formed a
government; it did not challenge the unconstitutional and undemocratic foundation of
the  EC.  Instead,  it  used  it  to  harass  and  intimidate  members  of  the  opposition.  For
example, the EC incriminated the former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto on charges of
misuse of power and possession of assets beyond known sources of income. Likewise,
Nusrat Bhutto (mother of Benazir Bhutto and a member of the National Assembly) was
also under suspicion of having accumulated assets beyond legal sources of income. Asif
Ali Zardari (husband of Benazir Bhutto and an MNA) was detained on five corruption
offences.  As a result,  party defection and horse-trading widened the rift between the
government and opposition parties (Rizvi 1999:181). While the conflict with opposition
parties worsened, the government developed serious disagreements with the army, which
eventually led to a military takeover in October 1999 (Rizvi 2000a). The chairman of the
EC  was  arrested  on  Musharraf’s  order  on  the  charge  of  using  the  agency  for  party
purposes (2006:133). The government and civil society challenged the legitimacy of the
coup. However, the SC not only validated it, but also tasked the military government to
make the political elite, bureaucrats and powerful private individuals truly accountable (
Syed Zafar Ali Shah and others v. General Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistan and others
2000). The verdict also expressed serious concern over the EC’s role in harassing political
opponents.
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11 Having received authorization from the ultimate judicial authority, nothing stood in the
way of the army’s will to prosecute the civilian elite. The military government adopted a
new anti-corruption law—the National Accountability Ordinance—and replaced the EC
with a more powerful anti-corruption agency—the National Accountability Bureau—on
November  16,  1999  (Musharraf  2006:150).  Among  various  changes,  the  Musharraf
government introduced a provision to tackle the problem of defaulted bank loans. One of
the major strategies of public corruption in Pakistan is the deliberate failure to repay
bank loans, even when the obligor has the capacity and possesses sufficient assets to
fulfill the legal contract. In many instances, politically powerful business groups, large
landowners, and politicians manage to secure soft loans from banks and later have them
written off.3 The Supreme Court of Pakistan (SC) took a suo motu action in January 2008—
an act that a court may perform on its own without receiving any formal application—on
massive loan write-offs: loans worth more than Rs. 54 billion ($516 million) have been
written off from 1991 to 2009 (Deadbeats got loans of 54 billion Written off loans v. Supreme
Court of Pakistan 2007). Surprisingly, the provision of willful default was introduced by the
same government that approved massive write-offs in October 2002.
12 Moreover, the NAB official record from October 1999 to December 2016 shows that more
than 627 individuals have been charged with (deliberate) default, 300 of living beyond any
known  source  of  income,  700  of  misusing  public  offices,  1,500  with  corruption  and
corrupt practices, 50 of cheating the public at large, 50 with embezzlement and 1,800 for
various  corrupt  practices.4 With  the  aim  of  bringing  deliberate  default  under  the
jurisdiction  of  the  anti-corruption  organization,  in  October  1999,  the  Musharraf
government added section 5(r)  called “willful  default”  to the National  Accountability
Ordinance (NAO 1999). This change in the law was justified on the grounds it would act as
a  deterrent  for  politicians  and  private  businessmen  tempted  to  engage  in  corrupt
practices. However, after the PML-Q came into power in October 2002, the then finance
minister,  Shaukat Aziz,  introduced a scheme for writing off  loans that around 50,000
people  benefited  from,  including  politicians  and  business  men.  When  a  confidential
report on the scheme submitted to the National Assembly’s Public Accounts Committee
was leaked in 2007, the SC took action. However, no further progress has been made and
the names of most beneficiaries remain unknown.
13 After Musharraf was ousted in 2008, none of the elected governments have attempted to
dismantle  the  NAB,  despite  the  fact  it  was  founded  by  a  military  government.  More
importantly,  none  tried  to  bring  the  military  and  the  judiciary—the  two  powerful
institutions that brought an end to civilian rule in 1999—under the NAB’s jurisdiction.
The controversial creation and the subsequent perpetuation of the EC and the NAB by
elected  governments  reveal  two  essential  features  of  the  interdependence  between
conflictual politics and accountability. First, the EC and the NAB were established by non-
elected institutions that had an interest in making elected representatives accountable.
Second, the fact that the jurisdiction of the accountability organizations has not been
extended to the military and the judiciary exposes the shortfalls of the democratic setup
in  Pakistan.  Elected  governments  have  been  unwilling  to  replace  the  subservient
organizations with strong autonomous ones.
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Biased legal provisions
14 Institutional conflicts and inter-political rivalries have not only been the cause of the
foundation  of  accountability  institutions  in  Pakistan  but  have  also  shaped  the  legal
provisions underpinning anti-corruption institutions—the Ehtesab Ordinance, 1996, the
Ehtesab Act, 1997, and the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999—in a manner such
that these tend to favor dominant over weak individuals.
15 The debate over article 13 during the adoption of the Ehtesab Act in 1997 is a case in
point.  When  the  PML-N  came  to  power  in  February  1997,  it  did  not  challenge  the
undemocratic establishment of the EC. Instead, it went on to change certain sections of
the law to its advantage, such as article 13. In the Ehtesab Ordinance, 1996, article 13 gave
the right to the (indirectly elected) President of Pakistan to appoint the head of the EC
after “consultation” with the Prime Minister, the leader of the opposition in the National
Assembly, and the Chief Justice of Pakistan (Gazette of Pakistan 1996). The consultation
procedure may seem to limit executive power, but in practice no office can invalidate the
appointment made by the President of Pakistan.
16 The  elected  civilian  government  of  Nawaz  Sharif  was  uneasy  with  the  appointing
authority resting with the President, since the very same office was responsible for the
dismissal  of  three previous elected governments,  precisely on grounds of  corruption.
President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed the governments of Benazir Bhutto in August
1990 and Nawaz Sharif in April 1993 and President Farooq Ahmed Laghari ousted Benazir
Bhutto’s government in November 1996. Predictably, the government of Nawaz Sharif
came up in May 1997 with its own tailor-made law—the Ehtesab Act, 1997 (EA)—bringing
the organization under its actual political control by changing the procedure to appoint
the Chief  Ehtesab Commissioner:  the Federal  Government after consultation with the
leader of the opposition and the Chief Justice of Pakistan would now appoint the head of
the EC (EA 1997).
17 However, while the government had been keen from the start to amend article 13 with
regard  to  the  appointing  authority,  it  refused  to  strike  down  article  17  known  as
“voluntary return,” which was arguably the most contentious part of the law. According
to the “voluntary return” provision, all charges may be dropped and no further inquiry
undertaken if an accused person voluntarily returns stolen money (EA 1997). Although
article 17 was meant as an incentive for corrupt persons to return stolen money, this
clause has also been used in furthering the interests of PML-N. In the shadow of harsh
trial outcome, the voluntary return provision has been used as an incentive, and as a
pressure tool to strike political deals with public officials.
18 Within a year of the adoption of the Ehtesab Act, the PML-N government felt compelled to
amend the law. In February 1998, right after its candidate Rafiq Tarar was elected by the
Parliament as the new President of Pakistan, the party in power tried to expand the
jurisdiction of the EC and to vest greater power in its chief by promulgating the Ehtesab
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1998 (Gazette of Pakistan 1998). The ordinance included several
significant amendments to the Ehtesab Act, 1997. Firstly, it added two sections—29(a) and
29(b)—to the law that empowered the head of the EC to discharge any accused person
from prosecution even after the charge was framed. Section 29(b) declared absolute trust
in the conduct of the head of the EC, which meant that the law presumed every action
taken by the head of the agency to be actually done in good faith. No third party had
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rights to recover damages caused during his or her tenure as the head of the EC. The
amendment allowed greater authority and legal protection to the head of the EC. More
specifically,  the  head  now  had  the  power  to  release  anyone  from  prosecution,  a
prerogative  which  could  be  used  in  exchange  for  switching  political  loyalties.  The
proposed amendment could thus facilitate political bargaining and negotiation. Secondly,
the proposed amendment widened the jurisdiction of the organization by modifying the
definition of a corrupt act. Article 3(d) of the Ehtesab Act, 1997 defined a corrupt act in
terms of illegitimate benefits given away to a spouse or dependents. The 1998 amendment
replaced the “spouse or dependents” with “any other person,” thus enlarging the scope
of the anti-corruption institution.
19 However, private corruption, as well as acts of corruption committed within military or
judicial institutions, were deliberately left outside the jurisdiction of the anti-corruption
organization. The Ehtesab Act, 1997 focused on bureaucratic and political corruption, that
is,  corruption within  bureaucratic  and elected  political  offices.  Although the  EC was
tasked  with  “eradicat[ing]  corruption  and  corrupt  practices  from  public  offices” 
(EA 1997), there was no provision in the law regarding any act of corruption committed
by a private person, military personnel or judge. This exclusive focus on civilian and
bureaucratic officials indicates a prejudice against political and civilian institutions.
20 When the NAB succeeded the EC in October 1999, the military regime also replaced the
Ehtesab Act, 1997 with a new law—the National Accountability Ordinance. However, there
remained biases similar to those inherent in the Ehtesab Act, 1997. For instance, article 15
of the NAO lays out different punishments for the same offence depending on whether it
is committed by a public person or a private individual. If a public official is convicted on
the basis of a plea bargain, s/he will be immediately discharged and disqualified from
holding any public office for ten years. On the other hand, the law does not propose any
sentence should a similar act be committed by a private person (NAO 1999).5
21 The office and powers of the chief of the anti-corruption institution were again contested.
Under section 6(b)(i) of the NAO, the authority of the President to appoint the chairman
of the NAB became subject to that of the self-proclaimed Chief Executive of Pakistan,
General Pervez Musharraf, who was actually in control of the appointment process and its
duration. Musharraf’s NAO also conferred on the chairman of the NAB the power to make
appointments within the organization, to frame rules and even to discharge an accused
person without the approval  of  the court.  Yet,  ironically,  such a powerful  chairman,
under the law, could be terminated by the President of Pakistan without any reason.
Musharraf later argued that such a powerful chairman was necessary to “put the fear of
God into the rich and powerful who had been looting the state” (Musharraf 2006:150).
22 Musharraf’s accountability law was challenged in the SC in April 2001 to investigate what
it called “excessive delegation of power” to the institutional chief (Khan Asfandyar Wali
and others v. Federation of Pakistan through. Cabinet Division, Islamabad and others 2001). The
highest court explained that the authority to appoint and dismiss the head of the NAB
resting with a single person gave the President of Pakistan—who by then was none other
than General Musharraf himself6—an unwarranted degree of control over the agency. The
SC went on to declare that parts of the NAO subverted the doctrine of the separation of
powers, according to which legislative, executive and judicial authorities should remain
separate and limited in such a way that each office holds the others to account (Khan
Asfandyar Wali and others v.  Federation of Pakistan through. Cabinet Division, Islamabad and
others 2001).  The jury struck down parts of the law and recommended that the Chief
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Executive of Pakistan be required to consult with the Chief Justice of Pakistan for the
future  appointment  of  the  Chairman,  that  the  Chairman  be  appointed  for  a  non-
extendable period of four years, and that the Chairman be removed by the President if
and only if  the Supreme Judicial  Council  of  Pakistan recommended his/her dismissal
(Gazette of Pakistan 2001).7 Thus, instead of proposing an independent and performance-
based mechanism for the appointment and removal of the head of the most important
anti-corruption organization, the SC assigned itself a sort of political role in this process.
23 But President Musharraf had no intention of relinquishing his control  over the NAB.
When his  political  party,  the  PML-Q,  came to  power  after  the  October  2002  general
elections, the Chief Executive of Pakistan once again amended the law through ordinance
to put aside the ambitious judiciary. According to the amendment, the chairman would
now be appointed by the President in “consultation” with the leader of the house (Prime
Minister)  and  the  leader  of  the  opposition  in  the  National  Assembly  (Gazette  of
Pakistan 2002).  Since the Prime Minister was handpicked under Musharraf’s  rule and
installed as the de jure ruler, the accountability agency effectively came back under the
control  of  the  President.  The  leader  of  the  opposition  insisted  that  the  word
“consultation” should be understood as  “approval,”  which would give the opposition
leader a strong role in the appointment process. Interestingly, the court agreed with the
opposition’s definition of “consultation” in the hope that it  would put an end to the
misuse of the accountability agency to discriminate against rival political groups.8 The
judgment read “for a consultation to be meaningful and purposive an attempt should be
made to reach at some consensus” (Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan v. Federation of Pakistan 2011).
24 Three points may be underlined here. First, the army, the executive and the judiciary all
sought to extend their control over the anti-corruption organization—first the EC and
then  the  NAB—which  shows  that  none  of  them  was  willing  to  grant  institutional
autonomy to the anti-corruption mechanism. Second, the Ehtesab Ordinance, 1996, the
Ehtesab  Act,  1997  and  the  National  Accountability  Ordinance,  1999  favored  strong
institutions such as the military and judiciary over weaker ones like the bureaucratic and
elected offices. Thus, anti-corruption laws target bureaucrats and politicians but ignore
judicial and military officials.
 
The politicized performance of the NAB
25 The NAB’s accountability process includes four stages. The NAB first receives a complaint
or itself initiates an inquiry into an alleged act of corruption (inquiry stage). If a person
under inquiry voluntarily comes forward and agrees to return the stolen amount, the
NAB may enter into a settlement called “voluntary return.” Voluntary return neither
results in conviction or penalty nor requires any approval from a trial court.9 If the NAB
fails to get a defendant to agree to such a settlement, the NAB may either close the case or
open  a  formal  investigation  (investigation  stage).  This  is  the  second  stage  of  the
accountability  process,  where  a  defendant  may  enter  into  a  settlement  called  “plea
bargain,” different from voluntary return in two respects. First, it results in conviction
for a public office holder. Second, it requires a court’s approval. If a defendant and the
NAB fail to enter into a plea bargain, the NAB brings the case before a trial court (trial
stage). At this third stage, the defendant may still enter into a plea agreement until the
court reaches the final verdict. At the last stage, an accountability court tries the case, but
the defendant has the right to appeal against the decision in a higher court.
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26 Let us now turn to the actual performance of the National Accountability Bureau in order
to evaluate in what way governmental change impacts its activity. Table I below gives us
an overview of the activities of the NAB under various governments.
 
Table I: Overview of the activities of the NAB under various governments
Cases
Military
Regime
Indirect Military
Rule
PPP
Government
PML-N
Government
Total
Cases filed 599 1304 1895 1629 5427
Convictions 192 186 75 7 460
Voluntary
returns
0 319 937 954 2210
Plea bargains 57 213 330 332 932
Pending 191 102 358 291 1153
-in court 161 99 281 238 990
-with NAB 30 3 77 53 163
Acquitted 116 158 133 26 433
Withdrawn 43 115 62 19 239
Source: Author’s calculation based on data available on the NAB ofﬁcial website (http://
www.nab.gov.pk/news_events.asp).
27 In principle, we may assume that when anti-corruption organizations achieve significant
impartiality and attain credibility, they are more likely to resist political interference in
their  investigative  activities  and  decision-making  process,  and  vice  versa.  It  seems
appropriate to evaluate the performance of an anti-corruption organization under the
assumption that if the transfer of power from one political party to another does not
significantly affect the activities of the agency, then we may say that the organization has
attained  a  certain  degree  of  autonomy.  However,  if  transition  and  succession  in
government—for example from a military regime to indirect military rule or from one
democratic  government  to  another—  dramatically  affects  the  activities  of  an  anti-
corruption organization such that the conduct of the agency coincides with the interests
of the governing party, then we may safely conclude that the organization is heavily
politicized.
28 Studies have shown that the effectiveness of punishment in deterring offenders increases
with the severity of the punishment (Moneymaker 1986:382). However, recent literature
argues that the deterrent effect depends more on the perceived certainty of the sentence
than on its severity (Nagin 2013). Therefore, in order to understand the functioning of the
NAB and its effect as a deterrent on potential offenders, we need to apprehend the degree
of certainty of the punishment it metes out. To that end, we shall examine the number of
convictions for each regime type: the higher the conviction rate, the more certain the
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punishment for potential offenders.  Thus, the number of convictions for each regime
type offers a measure for assessing the effectiveness of an anti-corruption body under
various governments.
 
Convictions
29 Given the fact that Pakistan’s powerful political elite has deep ties with high-ranking
officials in the bureaucracy, it may be safely assumed that members of the bureaucracy
and elected individuals do not generally undermine one another’s respective interests.
Additionally, because the Chairman of the NAB is appointed through a political process—
by the leader of  the house (Prime Minister)  and the leader of  the opposition in the
National Assembly—, we may also safely assume that the Chairman shall be susceptible to
external  influences.  Put  simply,  in  times  of  good  rapport  between  the  party  in
government and opposition parties, we may expect that the NAB tends not to prosecute
top-ranking officials. Moreover, lower-ranking officials are assumed to be less influential
as they enjoy no ties either with powerful  elected politicians or with officials  in the
bureaucracy.  We  will  shortly  see  that  yearly  data  on  the  conviction  of  top  officials
strongly support these hypotheses.
30 In order to understand the activity of the NAB, it is necessary to examine the convicted
officials’ ranks. In Table II, public officials have been loosely classified into three distinct
ranks—top, middle and low. The top rank notably includes the Prime Minister, cabinet
ministers, and chief secretaries—administrative heads of state institutions and CEOs of
private firms. The middle rank includes senior officers of police or officers equivalent to
the rank of assistant director. Non-commissioned officers such as station officers, clerks,
or managers have been treated as lower-ranking officials.
31 Table II shows the number and proportion of convictions within a particular rank for
each  regime—the  yearly  average  is  calculated  by  dividing  total  convictions  within  a
particular rank by the amount of time each regime was in power.10 For example, the
military regime ruled Pakistan for three years from October 1999 to October 2002, during
which time the NAB secured 116 convictions of top-ranking officials. According to the
calculation, under the military government,  the NAB secured 38.6 convictions of top-
ranking officials each year. Similar calculations have been made for voluntary returns,
plea bargains, withdrawal, pending and acquitted.
 
Table II: Convictions
Rank  of  officers
convicted
The NAB under:
Total
1999–
2016
Military
Regime
Indirect
Military Rule
PPP
Government
PML-N
Government
Top-ranking 116 47 17 1 181
Yearly average 38.6 8.8 3.2 0.28  
Middle-ranking 14 26 12 2 54
Yearly average 4.6 4.9 2.2 0.6  
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Low-ranking 62 113 46 4 225
Yearly average 20.6 21.2 8.8 1.1  
All ranks 192 186 75 7 460
Yearly average 64 34.9 14.3 2.0 26.1
Source: Author’s calculation based on data available on the NAB ofﬁcial website (http://
www.nab.gov.pk/news_events.asp).
32 Table II shows a stark contrast in the activity of the NAB between military and democratic
periods. Put together, more than 82 percent of convictions within all ranks were obtained
during direct (41.7 percent) and indirect military rule (40.4 percent). On the other hand,
only 16.3 percent of  total  convictions took place under the PPP government and 1.9
percent under PML-N rule. On a yearly basis, an average of 64 convictions within all ranks
took place under military rule, against 34.9 under indirect military rule, 14.3 during the
PPP government and 1.9  during the PML-N government.  The conviction rate  of  top-
ranking  officials  under  military  governments  wholly differs  from that  under  Nawaz
Sharif’s government. Courts convicted 38.6 officials of higher ranks under the military
regime on a yearly basis, whereas 27 officials of the same rank were sentenced when
Nawaz Sharif was in power, i.e. only one person in almost four years. There were only 18
convictions of top-ranking officials during a total of eight years of civilian rule (2008–
2016), while 116 officials were convicted during three years of the military regime (1999–
2002). These numbers give the impression that the organization that worked from 1999 to
2008 was not the same as that working after 2008. A certain political climate, discussed
below, helps explain why there is  a dramatic variation in the number of  convictions
between military and democratic periods.
33 A deeper look into the data reveals similarly contrasted patterns between direct and
indirect military rule. When Musharraf had no political party to support (1999–2002), the
NAB reached the highest conviction rate in Pakistan’s history. However, after Musharraf
became the veiled and undeclared leader of the PML-Q, the number dropped even though
the indirect military rule lasted for five years and four months: the NAB convicted only 47
higher-ranking  office  holders.  The  data  indicates  that  the  agency  was  relatively
aggressive in pursuing top-ranking officials during military rule, but comparatively less
so once the military decided to have a political face with the PML-Q. We may surmise that
Musharraf deemed a strong and uncompromising attitude towards corruption unlikely to
get him support from splinter groups breaking away from the PML-N.
34 Regarding public officials of top and middle ranks, Table II shows that they have also been
convicted more under direct and indirect military rule (1999–2008) than under civilian
governments  (2008–2016).  Additionally,  from one  civilian  government  (2008–2013)  to
another (2013–2016), the yearly conviction rate progressively declined. However, lower-
ranking  officials—the  least  influential  group—have  been convicted  more  often  under
democratic governments. We will also see below (in sub-sections “voluntary returns” and
“plea bargains”) that the same group has entered into settlements more than top- and
middle-ranking officials when the NAB operated under civilian governments. The focus
on lower-ranking officials benefits the NAB and civilian governments in a very important
way. Since the NAB publishes yearly performance data without showing the rank of the
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accused official, relatively improved performance in prosecuting lower-ranking officials
shows  improvement  in  the  overall  performance  of  the  agency.  In  addition,  it  hides
weaknesses and gaps in charging and prosecuting top-ranking officials.
35 The radical discrepancy in the number of convictions from one government to another
suggests  that  a  change  at  the  helm seriously  affects  the  activity  of  the  NAB.  These
statistics bolster the idea that the political and administrative system in Pakistan relies
largely on patronage networks whereby the political elite in collusion with high-ranking
bureaucracy officials share and protect each other’s interests (Lyon 2002). Perhaps, this is
why the Federal  Investigation Agency established in 1975 has yet  to convict  a single
public  official  of  the rank of  assistant  director  or  above (Hafiez  2002:48).  Before the
establishment of the EC and the NAB, the Federal Investigation Agency was responsible
for investigating the offences of bribery and misuse of public office.
 
Voluntary returns
36 As  for  the  number  of  convictions,  there  are  great  discrepancies  in  the  number  of
voluntary returns registered by the NAB under various governments.  However,  these
show a reversed pattern. On a yearly basis, an average 215 voluntary returns within all
ranks have been registered during the PML-N government, 149 under PPP rule, 50 under
indirect military rule and not a single case of voluntary return was reported during the
entire military regime.  Significantly,  more than 85 percent of  total  voluntary returns
were  reported  under  the  two  civilian  governments  (2008–2013  and  2013–2016):  43.1
percent under the PPP government and 42.4 under the PML-N government. These figures
indicate that the NAB under civilian governments focused more on voluntary settlements
than on convictions. By contrast, not a single voluntary return was reported during direct
military rule, and the NAB only began working on voluntary returns after the PML-Q
came to power in 2002.
 
Table III: Voluntary returns
Rank  of  officers
convicted
The NAB under:
Total
1999–
2016
Military
Regime
Indirect
Military Rule
PPP
Government
PML-N
Government
Top-ranking 0 3 27 18 48
Yearly average 0.0 0.6 5.1 5.0  
Middle-ranking 0 47 123 165 335
Yearly average 0.0 8.8 23.4 46.0  
Low-ranking 0 269 787 771 1827
Yearly average 0.0 50.5 149.9 215.4  
All ranks 0 319 937 954 2210
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Yearly average 0.0 59.8 178.5 266.5  
Source: Author’s calculation based on data available on the NAB ofﬁcial website (http://
www.nab.gov.pk/news_events.asp).
37 The breakdown according to officials’  ranks shows a similar pattern.  During the PPP
government, more than 56 percent of the returns (or a yearly average of 5.1, more or less
maintained by the following PML-N government) came from top-ranking officials, against
only  6.3  percent  (or  a  yearly  average  of  0.6)  during  indirect  military  rule.  An
extraordinarily high percentage of voluntary returns from high-ranking officials during
the PPP government shows that the civilian administration was not much interested in
convicting powerful officials but preferred receiving misappropriated funds. Conversely,
during the PML-Q government under indirect military rule, the NAB adopted a policy of
not  accepting  the  offers  of  voluntary  return,  as  indicated  by  their  relatively  low
percentage.  For low-ranking officers,  the agency approved about 50 voluntary return
applications per year (269 in total) during the military regime, but this number jumped to
almost 150 per year (787 in total) when the PPP was in power, a trend even intensified
under the PML-N, with a yearly average of about 215 returns from low-ranking officials
(for a total of 771 over less than four years). The returns from middle-ranking officials
progressively  increased  as  the  agency  came  under  growing  oversight  by  democratic
governments.
38 The number of voluntary returns needs to be compared with the conviction rate and the
total number of cases. For instance, during the PML-N government, approximately 85
percent of total investigations undertaken by the NAB targeted low- and middle-ranking
officials, and about 71.3 percent of total cases were disposed of as voluntary settlements.
As a result of this policy, the number of convictions dipped to the record low of seven
cases over less than four years, representing 1.5 percent of total convictions over the
sixteen-year period.
 
Plea bargains
39 According to section 25(b) of the NAO known as “plea bargaining,” if an accused person
agrees to return the illicit money after the commencement of the investigation or a jury
trial, the defendant may enter into a plea bargain, subject to court approval (NAO 1999).
As in the case of convictions and voluntary returns, the number of plea bargains suggests
that  the  transfer  of  power  from the  military  regime  to  the  civilian  government  or
between civilian governments has affected the activity of the NAB, particularly in the
manner in which it helped those in power carry out their political goals and further their
interests.
40 The yearly average of plea bargains across all ranks progressively increased over the
years:  an  average  of  19  plea  bargains  were  settled  every  year  under  the  military
government, around 40 under indirect military rule, 62 under the PPP government and 92
during PML-N rule. Most of the plea bargains were approved under the two democratic
governments (71 percent); against only 29 percent under direct and indirect military rule.
These figures again indicate that the NAB under Musharraf was not as keen on bargaining
with offenders as later civilian governments.
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41 Nearly 50 percent of total plea settlements under the PML-N government were concluded
with top-ranking officials, while this percentage stood at less than 15 percent under the
PPP government. In the PPP period, however, almost 45 percent of total plea bargains
were concluded with low-ranking officials,  against 25.4 percent in the PML-N period.
Therefore, the NAB under the PML-N government focused on plea bargaining with top-
ranking officials rather than with the middle- or low-cadre officials, whereas the NAB
under the PPP government followed the opposite policy. This result bolsters the public
perception that the PPP government was relatively more tolerant towards corruption
than the PML-N government.11
 
Table IV: Plea bargains
Rank  of  officers
convicted
The NAB under:
Total
1999–
2016
Military
Regime
Indirect
Military Rule
PPP
Government
PML-N
Government
Top-ranking 40 20 25 83 168
Yearly average 13.3 3.7 4.7 23.1  
Middle-ranking 8 118 180 178 484
Yearly average 2.6 22.1 34.2 49.7  
Low-ranking 9 75 125 71 280
Yearly average 3.0 14.0 23.8 19.8  
All ranks 5 213 330 332 932
Yearly average 19.0 39.9 62.8 92.7  
Source: Author’s calculation based on data available on the NAB ofﬁcial website (http://
www.nab.gov.pk/news_events.asp).
 
Pending, acquitted and withdrawn cases
42 The fact that the NAB was affected by the transition from military to civilian rule is also
visible by critically assessing the data relating to cases which were withdrawn, challenged
in  appellate  courts,  acquitted,  or  remain  pending.  In  particular,  the  anti-corruption
organization under civilian governments failed to bring 76 percent of  cases involving
high-ranking officials before a trial court (see Table V). Conversely, the same agency has
been very  efficient  in  expediting  cases  involving  low-ranking  officials,  with  only  0.3
percent  of  cases  still  pending  in  the  NAB.  These  percentages  suggest that,  under
democratic  governments,  the  NAB has  been reluctant  to  bring  high-ranking officials
before trial courts, and as a result a large number of cases have remained pending in the
agency. However, the organization was efficient in bringing low-ranking officials to court.
Under direct or indirect military rule, about 78 percent of indicted top-ranking officials
were  acquitted  and/or  their  case  withdrawn.  As  suggested  by  these  and  other
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percentages, the NAB under Pervez Musharraf either convicted or acquitted high-ranking
officials. In other words, the agency remained relatively reluctant to offer settlements to
top-ranking officials.
 
Table V: Pending, acquitted and withdrawn
Rank  of  officers
accused
The NAB under:
Total
Military
Regime
Indirect
Military Rule
PPP
Government
PML-N
Government
Top-
ranking
Pending  in
Court
119 98 87 72 376
Yearly
Average
39.6 18.3 16.5 20.1  
Acquitted 79 55 32 5 171
Yearly
Average
26.3 10.3 6.0 1.3  
Withdrawn 30 46 17 5 98
Yearly
Average
10.0 8.6 3.2 1.3  
Pending  in
NAB
24 2 48 35 109
Yearly
Average
8.0 0.3 9.1 9.7  
Middle-
ranking
Pending  in
Court
19 60 64 90 233
Yearly
Average
6.3 11.2 12.1 25.1  
Acquitted 18 23 40 7 88
Yearly
Average
6.0 4.3 7.6 1.9  
Withdrawn 7 29 26 4 66
Yearly
Average
2.3 5.4 4.9 1.1  
Pending  in
NAB
6 1 27 18 52
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Yearly
Average
2.0 0.18 5.14 5.0  
Low-
ranking 
Pending  in
Court
23 152 130 76 381
Yearly
Average
7.6 28.5 24.7 21.2  
Acquitted 19 80 61 14 174
Yearly
Average
6.3 15.0 11.6 3.9  
Withdrawn 6 40 19 10 75
Yearly
Average
2.0 7.5 3.6 2.7  
Pending  in
NAB
0 0 2 0 2
Yearly
Average
0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0  
All ranks 350 586 553 336 1825
Yearly
average
116.6 109.9 105.3 93.8  
Source: Author’s calculation based on data available on the NAB ofﬁcial website (http://
www.nab.gov.pk/news_events.asp).
 
Political interests and the NAB
43 Radical shifts in the conduct of the NAB have occurred as transfers of power took place.
We may therefore wonder what drove such contrasting shifts.
44 For example, under direct military rule the agency focused on convicting top-ranking
officials,  while  there  was  not  a  single  case  of  voluntary  returns  and  very  few  plea
bargains. This was a period of high tension between political players, and Musharraf was
then casting himself as a savior liberating the country from corrupt politicians. Although
the NAB reached its highest level of convictions under direct military rule, the number of
convictions and indictments of  top-ranking officials  greatly dropped after the PML-Q
came into power. The NAB began to accept a greater number of voluntary returns and
plea bargains, and now they were largely focused on middle- and low-ranking officials.
This  approach in  part  improved the  recovery  of  stolen  funds;  however  it  decreased
conviction rates. When enmity between political parties cooled, the activity of the NAB
either  ebbed or  occurred in non-significant  areas  involving low-  and middle-ranking
officials.
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45 In spite of the fact that the PPP-led government was marred by allegations of corruption
and  political  compromise,  the  NAB  emphasized  settlements  over  convictions.  The
hostility that had been a stand-out characteristic of Pakistan’s political system in the
preceding years somewhat dissipated during the PPP government, as a sort of political
understanding between the government and the opposition helped the PPP government
complete its five-year term. This era was marked by a low degree of inter-political rivalry
and  institutional  antagonism  but  tainted  by  a  very  large  number  of  allegations  of
corruption. The good rapport between the PPP and PML-N is likely to have limited the
activities of the NAB. Instead of prosecuting and convicting corrupt officials, the NAB
entered into negotiations with accused individuals. As a result, it recorded the highest
number  of  voluntary  returns  and  plea  bargains,  as  the  understanding  between  the
government and the opposition paved the way for the NAB and the accused to reach
settlements.  Moreover,  almost  87 percent  of  the cases  investigated by the institution
during the PPP government indicted low and middle-ranking officials, public officers that
entailed  no  serious  political  consequences  for  the  government.  This  policy  certainly
helped the PPP complete its tenure.
 
Conclusion
46 No democratic government has created an anti-corruption body in Pakistan.12 The main
institutions—the EC and the NAB—were established in the wake of  the overthrow of
democratically-elected  governments  by  non-elected  actors.  The  highest  courts  have
validated  the  legitimacy  of  these  organizations  while  later  democratically-elected
governments  have  continued  to  run  them.  The  illiberal  origin  of  anti-corruption
organizations in Pakistan exposes the latent conflict between elected and non-elected
groups as they attempt to use anti-corruption agencies for their own benefit. While the
NAB’s existence is not contested as such, various institutions still attempt to exert control
over the anti-corruption organization,  as  illustrated by the conflicts  surrounding the
chairman’s appointment and role or the actual implications of the term “consultation.” In
fact,  neither  the  military  nor  the  government  nor  the  judiciary  has  ever  earnestly
intended  to  grant  full  autonomy  to  the  accountability  organization.  Each  office  has
sought  to  bring  the  operation  of  the  organization  into  line  with  its  own version  of
accountability and institutional interests.
47 As a result of its undemocratic foundations, the anti-corruption organization is regulated
by laws that are negatively biased against public officials. The EC deliberately excluded
harmful  behavior  in  the  private  sector,  the  military  and  judiciary  from  its  own
jurisdiction, but focused instead on public malpractices. Although the NAO has taken a
step towards bringing private-sector corruption under its jurisdiction, corrupt practices
in the military and judiciary still fall outside of its legal authority. In addition, the NAO
prescribes different punishments for the same offence committed by a public person or a
private individual. It shows that sentences are intimately connected with the nature of
one’s  employment.  Punishment  and  its  severity  are embroiled  with  divided  politics.
Therefore, only weak institutions, groups and individuals are subject to accountability
mechanisms.
48 Because it lacks independence from powerful institutions, the NAB is deeply affected by
governmental change,  as indicated by our data.  The uneven performance of the NAB
shown by the dataset demonstrates that the institution has failed to free itself from the
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influences of government political parties and that its conduct has been intimately tied to
a  conflict-prone  political  climate.  As  soon  as  the  degree  of  political  inclusiveness
increases,  the anti-corruption mechanism tends to fall  back on low- and middle-rank
officials and is most likely to capitalize more on voluntary returns and plea bargains,
resulting in a low conviction rate. The various shifts in the activity of the NAB suggest a
political use of the institution. In particular, we observe that in the recent past elected
governments  have  tended  to  favor  voluntary  returns  and  plea-settlements  over
convictions, in spite of numerous allegations of corruption, and have targeted low- and
middle-ranking  officials  rather  than  top-ranking  ones.  This  strategy  has  served  to
maintain a good rapport between the PPP and the PML-N, thus ensuring the low degree of
inter-political rivalry and institutional antagonism that allowed the PPP-led government
to be the first in Pakistan’s history to complete its five-year mandate. Although this was
rightly  celebrated  as  a  significant  democratic  achievement,  the  apparent  stability  of
elected political institutions came at the cost of limiting the activities of the NAB and
letting corrupt officials off the hook.
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NOTES
1. Before  the  establishment  of  the  Ehtesab  Cell  which  was  later  succeeded  by  the  National
Accountability  Bureau in November 1999,  the Federal  Investigation Agency (FIA),  founded in
January, 1975, was primarily responsible for investigating offences of bribery and abuse of public
office. In 2004, the Government of Pakistan made the NAB solely responsible for anti-corruption
operations.  The  FIA  now  investigates  cases  related  to  organized  crime,  smuggling,  human
trafficking, counterfeit currency, immigration and drugs.
2. Since its  inception in November 1999, the NAB regularly updates performance data on its
official  website:  http://www.nab.gov.pk/news_events.asp.  What  is  used  here  is  the
approximately 16 years of  available  data (from October 1999 to December 2016).  Despite  the
critical importance of governance and the rule of law for fragile democracies such as Pakistan,
the statistical literature on Pakistan’s anti-corruption institutions is almost non-existent.
3. For example, Fauzia Gilani, the wife of the then Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, got a write-
off worth Rs. 38 million ($342,000) in 2010.
4. Data is available at http://www.nab.gov.pk/news_events.asp.
5. In 2005, the jurisdiction of the NAB was challenged in the SC regarding the NAB’s power to
arrest or charge a private person—a person not holding public office and who has not aided or
assisted or acted in collusion with a public office holder in accumulating illegal assets. The SC
rejected the plea that the NAB only has jurisdiction over public officials. For details, see http://
www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/Crl.A.140of2005.pdf.
6. General Pervez Musharraf forced Muhammad Rafiq Tarar to resign and took over as President
of Pakistan on June 20, 2001.
7. The Supreme Judicial Council consists of five members: the Chief Justice of Pakistan, the two
next most senior judges of the Supreme Court and the two most senior Chief Justices of High
Courts.
8. See the constitutional petition “Against the appointment of Chairman, National Accountability
Bureau.”
9. The voluntary return provision was first introduced by the interim government through the
Ehtesab Ordinance, 1996. Despite its controversial nature, the same provision made its way into
the Ehtesab Act, 1997 and then into the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999.
10. The total number of convictions within a particular rank under one regime divided by the
total  time  the  regime  lasted.  Calculations  are  based  on  the  following  time  periods:  military
regime, three years (October 1999 to October 2002); indirect military rule, five years and four
months  (October  2002  to  February  2008);  PPP  Government,  five  years  and  three  months
(February 2008 to May 2013); PML-N Government, three years and seven months (May 2013 to
December 2016).
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11. Several  surveys are available  including Transparency International,  World Bank and IMF
showing that the PML-N government performed better in combating corruption than the PPP
government. For details on the Corruption Perception Index, see https://www.transparency.org/
country/PAK. For details on transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector
published  by  the  World  Bank,  see  https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.CPA.TRAN.XQ?
locations=PK.
12. Although the FIA came into existence during the elected government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
(1973–77), it was not created from scratch. Pakistan inherited from the British government a
crime  agency  known  as  the  “Federally  Controlled  Police  Establishment,”  renamed  “Pakistan
Special Police Establishment” at the time of independence. However, in view of the increasing
abuse of public office, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s government decided to tackle corruption. For this
purpose, the jurisdiction of the Pakistan Special Police Establishment was expanded and renamed
as FIA in 1975.
ABSTRACTS
In Pakistan, the struggle over power often provokes people to spin the law towards their own
interests  and  (mis)use  state  institutions  to  reach  political  ends. Under  such  conflictual
circumstances,  anti-corruption  institutions  are  frequently  used  by  the  people  in  power  to
persecute opposition parties. This paper has two aims. First, it attempts to show that political
disputes  and the  conflict  between civilian  and military  authorities  have  not  only  led  to  the
foundation of anti-corruption agencies at the national level—the Ehtesab Cell (EC) and National
Accountability Bureau (NAB)—but also created a bias against civilian institutions in the legal
provisions that regulate their activity. Second, the paper uses new statistical data to show that
the NAB, founded in November 1999, has tended to side with the interests of the parties and
people in government.
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